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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3002 
___________ 
 
MS. ROSARIO ROSE TAYLOR, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KATHRYN H. ANDERSON, Office of Civil Right Census EEO Washington; 
PATRICIA A. DENNIS, Area Manager Census Phila;  
WESLEY R. GARRETT, Field Operations Supervisor Census;  
JOHN DOZIER, Crew Leader; KIMBERLY WILLIAMS;  
JENNIFER SELBY, Personal Assistant to Crew Leader, John Dozier 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-11-cv-01170) 
District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 19, 2013 
 
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed April 23, 2013) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 
 Rosario Rose Taylor appeals pro se from the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  We will affirm. 
      I. 
In 2011, Rosario Rose Taylor filed a pro se complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  In her amended complaint, Taylor 
claimed that, while working as an enumerator for the United States Census Bureau 
(“USCB”) during the 2010 census, she suffered adverse employment actions in violation 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Allegedly due to her race and national 
origin, her crew leader, John Dozier, and five other colleagues maliciously tampered with 
her completed surveys, delayed paying her, retook her fingerprints, did not assign her 
work when other enumerators in her crew were given work, and ultimately fired her. 
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants argued that 
Taylor failed to demonstrate circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.  
They offered excerpts from Taylor’s deposition testimony, in which Taylor attributed her 
poor treatment to a personal quarrel – unrelated to race or national origin – between 
Taylor and Dozier’s assistant, Defendant Jennifer Selby.  Moreover, the defendants 
asserted that Taylor was terminated because the census work was temporary, most of the 
enumerators’ employment came to an end at the same time as Taylor’s, and Taylor had 
“documented disciplinary and work quality issues.” 
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 The District Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding 
that Taylor failed to raise an inference of discrimination, and thus did not establish a 
prima facie case of unlawful discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  
Even if she had, the District Court noted, Taylor offered no evidence to counter the 
defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment actions 
she suffered.  Taylor timely appealed from the District Court’s judgment. 
      II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment.  See Alcoa, Inc. v. United 
States, 509 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2007).  Summary judgment is appropriate when the 
movant demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We may affirm 
the District Court on any grounds supported by the record.  See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 
798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000).  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
III. 
We analyze Taylor’s Title VII discrimination claim according to the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework.  See Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem'l Hosp., 192 F.3d 
378, 385 (3d Cir. 1999).  Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Taylor bore the 
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of a Title VII violation.  See McDonnell 
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  If she succeeded, the burden would then have shifted to the 
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defendants to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for her termination.  
See id.  Taylor would then have had an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the legitimate reason for her termination offered by the defendants was a 
pretext for unlawful discrimination.  See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 
(3d Cir. 1999). 
We agree with the District Court that, even assuming Taylor could prove her 
prima facie case of unlawful discrimination, she failed to show that the defendants’ 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her were a pretext.  In response to 
Taylor’s allegations, the defendants offered evidence that Taylor was terminated for 
reasons other than race or national origin.  Specifically, the defendants submitted 
evidence that: (1) Taylor believed her employment contract ended before the time that 
she stopped working for the USCB; (2) Taylor was terminated at the same time as many 
other enumerators due to lack of enumeration work; and (3) Taylor’s crew leader and the 
other enumerators had reported and documented their concerns about the quality of 
Taylor’s work.  The USCB therefore articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for Taylor’s termination.  See Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702, 706 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(stating that the employer’s burden of production at this stage is “relatively light, and the 
employer need only introduce evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion 
that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable employment decision.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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Taylor subsequently pointed to no evidence that would allow a reasonable fact 
finder to conclude that the defendants’ stated reasons for terminating her were a pretext.  
See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that, to demonstrate an 
employer’s stated reason for termination was a pretext, a plaintiff  “must point to some 
evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) 
disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious 
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the 
employer’s action.”)  Here, Taylor does not dispute that the census work in her region 
had wound down at the time she was terminated, or that she was first transferred to a 
different area, enabling her to work beyond the term of her contract.  Although she 
speculated that her negative performance reviews were motivated by animus based on her 
race and national origin, Taylor pointed to no evidence, direct or circumstantial, 
suggesting that the USCB terminated her employment for any unlawfully discriminatory 
reason.  See Tomasso, 445 F.3d at 706 (“[Plaintiff] must demonstrate such weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s 
proferred legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally 
find them unworthy of credence, and hence infer that the employer did not act for the 
asserted non-discriminatory reasons internal punctuation and citation omitted.”); see also 
Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that “an 
inference based upon a speculation or conjecture does not create a material factual 
dispute sufficient to defeat entry of summary judgment (citation omitted); Spangle v. 
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Valley Forge Sewer Auth., 839 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding summary judgment 
to be proper where, after burden-shifting, plaintiff cannot raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reason for an adverse action is 
pretext for discrimination). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
